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TOWARD A JURAL PASIGRAPHY
By THOMPSON G. MARSH*
A generation before the term came in vogue, Professor
Marsh was an interdisciplinarian. Applying his extensive back-
ground in mathematics and logic, he has taught thousands of
first year law students the art of case analysis. The following
article is the fruit of Professor Marsh's study and teaching in
Analytical Jurisprudence.t No more fitting tribute to Profes-
sor Marsh's scholarship can be found.
INTRODUCTION
T HE vast irrelevance of analytical jurisprudence is of course
reciprocal. It does not affect, nor is it affected by the
nature of justice, the nature of man, the nature of nature, or
the nature of God. It is not concerned with the source of law,
whether it be the command of the sovereign, the social com-
pact, the resultant of social forces, reason, social evolution, or
whatever. It has nothing to do with the function of law, as a
means of leading men to happiness and the good life, as a
means of social control, or as a stabilizing influence.
Analytical jurisprudence is almost as abstract as mathe-
matics, and it is therefore inherently universal, unaffected by
time or place or content.
It is the purpose of this essay to develop another similarity
between analytical jurisprudence and mathematics - a spe-
cialized written language composed of nonword symbols.
The utility of the customary symbols of mathematics will
be appreciated if one solves a problem in long division in ordi-
nary literary form, using sentences composed of such words
as divisor, dividend, quotient, and subtrahend. It is believed
that for analytical jurisprudence as for mathematics, a language
composed of nonword symbols is more useful than one com-
posed of words and sentences.
Ideas may be symbolized by words or by nonword symbols.
A language or system of nonword symbols is called a pasi-
graphy. A jural pasigraphy is proposed.
* Charles W. Delaney, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Col-
lege of Law; A.B., 1924, LL.B., 1927, M.A., 1931, University of Denver;
LL.M., 1931, Northwestern University; J.S.D. 1935, Yale University.
t For those interested in further reading in the area, see Marsh, The
Legal Continuum, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 459 (1969).
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
How should a jural pasigraphy be constructed? Alfred
Korzybski has deplored the inadequacy of ordinary language,
with its basic form of subject and predicate. He has said that
it is ill suited for the expression of processes and that what is
needed is a language that closely resembles the form of the
subject matter.'
In order to develop such a language for analytical juris-
prudence- a jural pasigraphy - the form of which would
closely resemble the subject matter, it is of course necessary
to determine the form of the subject matter.
It is always difficult to identify the origin of an idea, but
Huntington Cairns credits Johann Fichte with having isolated
the conception that the basis of law is the idea of the legal
relation.
2
The conception of Law is the conception of a relation
between rational beings. Hence it results only when such
beings are thought as in relation to each other. It is non-
sense to speak of rights between man and nature, or between
man and the ground, soil, or animals, etc., as such....
It is only when two persons are related to the same
thing that a question arises as to the Right to the thing, or,
more properly expressed, as to the Right which one person
has against the other to exclude him from the use of such
thing.3
A plausible explanation for the introduction of this Fich-
tean idea into the study of analytical jurisprudence in the
common law can be found in the fact that John Austin spent
the winter of 1827-28 in Germany, preparing himself for his
lectures on jurisprudence at the University of London. This
in itself would justify the assumption that Austin became
acquainted with the work of Fichte, and the assumption is
confirmed by that part of Austin's 45th lecture in which he
criticized one of Fichte's statements about the function of
government.
4
From Austin the course of development is clear: Holland
(1880), Hohfeld (1913), Kocourek (1927). The high point was
reached by Hohfeld. Though he did not mention Fichte, his
'A. KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY (4th ed. 1958). It is believed that
his thesis has been correctly stated, but it is difficult to find quotable
passages of reasonable length in this discursive book. The material
beginning at the following pages is relevant: 50, 57, 59, 66, 92, 96, 110,
224, 227, 254, 261, 371, 563.
2 H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 469-71 (1949).
3 Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach den Principien der Wissen-
schaftslehre, in THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS 81-82 (A. Kroeger transl. 1869).
4 II J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 790 (4th ed. 1873).
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idea was wholly Fichtean. He described and compared eight
legal relations which he called fundamental legal conceptions,
and he asserted that "these eight conceptions . . . seem to be
what may be called 'the lowest common denominators of the
law' . . to which any and all 'legal quantities' may be
reduced."5
Hohfeld's essays evoked a great deal of contemporary in-
terest, and although analytical jurisprudence was very soon
overwhelmed by the various kinds of sociological jurisprudence,
Hohfeld was not refuted.
6
The most enduring manifestation of Hohfeldian analysis
is to be found in the Restatement of the Law of Property
where it is stated that:
The word "property" is used in this Restatement to
denote legal relations between persons with respect to a
thing. . . . Clarity of thought and exactness of expression
require the analysis and subdivision of legal relations into
types having different significances. This analysis is made
in §§ 1-4 defining respectively those legal relations desig-
nated by the words "right," "privilege," "power" and "im-
munity." 7
These four plus duty, no-right, liability, and disability are
Hohfeld's eight fundamental legal conceptions.
II. KOCOUREK'S PASIGRAPHY
In order to develop a jural pasigraphy in accordance with
Korzybski's thesis that the form of a language should closely
resemble the form of the subject matter, it seems proper to
adopt the Fichtean theory of the legal relation as the form
of the subject matter.
The next step is to consider the form of a legal relation.
Fichte's statement has already been noted: "a relation between
rational beings."8
Austin said, "A party has a right, when another or others
5 W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING 23 (1919); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58-59 (1913).
6 Students of the Hohfeldian system will recall his claim that his
set of fundamental legal relations constituted 'the lowest common
denominators' of all legal discourse, by which he meant that any-
thing that is said in other language can also be said in terms of
his fundamental legal relations .... Nobody yet seems to have dis-
covered a counter-example, i.e., a proposition expressed in other
legal language that cannot also be expressed in the Hohfeldian
language.
Address by Prof. Layman E. Allen, Proceedings of the First National
Law and Electronics Conference, 1962.
7RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note at 3-4 (1936).
8 See p. 352 & note 3 supra.
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are bound or obliged by law, to do or to forbear, towards or in
regard to him."9
Holland, following Austin, analyzed and diagrammed the
elements of a right as follows:
"The series of elements into which a Right may be resolved
is therefore:
The Person The Object The Act The Person
Entitled or Forbearance Obliged"10
It will be noticed that the person who has the right is at
the left and the person who owes the duty is at the right and
that "the act or forbearance" (almost the very words of
Austin) is placed between the persons.
Hohfeld declined to define his eight fundamental legal con-
ceptions because he considered them to be sui generis. 11
They are, however, defined in the first four sections of the
Restatement of the Law of Property in a way which is com-
pletely consistent with Hohfeld's analysis.
The legal relation which was called a "right" by Austin
and Holland and the Restatement was called a "claim" by
Kocourek, and he symbolized it as "A < B" when A has a
claim that B act or forbear.
12
This symbol, one of the basic symbols in Kocourek's at-
tempt to develop a jural pasigraphy, satisfies Korzybski's
demand that the form of a language resemble the form of the
subject matter. The two persons of the Fichtean relation are
represented as A and B. The Austinian obligation to act (to do
or to forbear) is represented by an arrow pointing left from
B, who owes the obligation, toward A, to whom it is owed.
The arrangement is the same as that in Holland's diagram.
An immediate consequence of the adoption of this nonword
symbol to represent the "right" of Fichte, Austin, Holland, and
the Restatement, as well as the "claim" of Kocourek, is that
there is no need to quibble about the name. The symbol rep-
resents the idea, whatever it may be named.
The fact that this one symbol, A < B, may also be used
to represent the Restatement's Hohfeldian relations of duty,
privilege, and no-right probably requires explanation.
A right, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a
9 1 J. AUsTIN, supra note 4, at 277.
lo T. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 77 (1886).
11 W. HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 30.
12A. KocouREK, JURAL RELATIONs 21, 51 (1927).
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legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that
the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given act.
13
The relation indicated by the word "right" may also be
stated from the point of view of the person against whom
that right exists. This person has a duty, that is, is under
a legally enforceable obligation to do or not to do an act.
The word "duty" is used in this Restatement with this
meaning.
14
Thus, A <- B means that A has a right that B act, and that
B owes A a duty to act.
A privilege, as the word is used in this Restatement,
is a legal freedom on the part of one person as against
another to do a given act or a legal freedom not to do a
given act.15
The relation indicated by the word "privilege" may also
be stated from the point of view of the person against
whom the privilege exists. From the point of view of this
other person it may be said that there is no right on his
part that the first person should not engage in the particu-
lar course of action or of nonaction in question. 16
By adding a zero above the arrow the existence of a relation
may be negated. Thus, A <-- B means that A has no right
that B act, and that B has a privilege not to act. If in the
description of a particular situation there is no need to empha-
size the fact that a duty does not exist, the symbol may simply
be omitted.
Hohfeld identified four more legal relations: power, lia-
bility, immunity, and disability, and they are defined in the
Restatement.
A power, as the word is used in this Restatement, is an
ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a
given legal relation by doing or not doing a given act.17
The relation indicated by the word "power" may also be
stated from the point of view of the person whose legal re-
lation is thus liable to be changed. The subjection of the
second person to having his legal relation affected by the
conduct of the person having the power is a "liability" and
the word is used in this Restatement with this meaning.18
Kocourek agreed that this relation should be called a
13 RETATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936).
14 Id., comment a at 4.
15 Id. § 2.
16 Id., comment a at 5.
17 Id. § 3.
1S Id., comment a at 6.
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power, and symbolized it as A ---> B,19 indicating that in this
relation the act moves from A, who has the power, toward B,
who is subjected to the liability.
An immunity, as the word is used in this Restatement, is
a freedom on the part of one person against having a given
legal relation altered by a given act or omission to act on
the part of another person.20
The relation indicated by the word "immunity" may
also be stated from the point of view of the person with
respect to whom the immunity exists, that is, who has no
ability so to alter the given legal relation. This second per-
son has, in this particular, a disability with regard to the
first person and the word "disability" is used in this Re-
statement with this meaning. 2'
Since immunity is merely the negation of power it may be
represented as A -- > B, for the sake of emphasis, or simply
omitted, as was mentioned in the discussion of privilege.
If Hohfeld was right when he said that right, duty, privi-
lege, no-right, power, liability, immunity, and disability "seem
to be what may be called 'the lowest common denominators
of the law' . . . to which any and all 'legal quantities' may be
reduced,'22 then all "legal quantities" may be represented by
the symbols A < B, A <- B, A -->B, and A --- >B.
If "legal quantities" were static (and this may have been
what Hohfeld had in mind) then nothing else would be re-
quired for a jural pasigraphy. However, whatever may be the
nature of a "legal quantity," a legal transaction is dynamic.
Things happen, and as a consequence thereof legal relations
are changed. In order to depict this process Kocourek invented
what might be called a syntax for a jural pasigraphy. He called
his arrangements of symbols "linear graphs of concatenation."
The following is an example:
23
( (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) A[ + ]B
A( + )BVA + B<B( + )AVB + A< <
--- > - -B[ A
[Explanation: (1) is the power of A to make an offer to B;
(2) is the evolution of the preceding relation; (3) is the result
of the preceding evolution-power of B to accept A's offer;
(4) is the evolution of the next preceding relation; (5) is a
complex of two independent relations of B and A, respec-
19 A. KocouREx, supra note 12, at 21, 54.
20 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 4 (1936).
21 Id., comment a at 8.
22 W. HOHFELD, supra note 5.
23 A. KoCOUREK, supra note 12, at 72.
VOL. 50
TOWARD A JURAL PASIGRAPHY
tively as domini Round brackets indicate mesonomic rela-
tions and square brackets indicate zygnomic relations. The
sign V means evolution; the sign < is equivalent to "result-
ing in." Unbracketed arrows are evolved relations or jural
facts.]
The transaction begins at the left. As it develops and as
the legal relations change, the symbols change and are arranged
chronologically toward the right.
This arrangement of symbols- in a strictly chronological
sequence, rather than in a sequence of subject and predicate
-is the most important aspect of the proposed jural pasigraphy
because it is so well suited for the depiction of a dynamic
process, and in this respect conforms to Korzybski's desi-
deratum.
A consequence of this chronological arrangement is that
all the legal relations which exist at any one time must be
represented by a column of symbols, as are those which con-
clude Kocourek's example of a linear graph of concatenation.
III. A REFInE PASIGRAPHY
The basic requirements of a jural pasigraphy have thus
been established: symbols (corresponding to the Arabic num-
erals of arithmetic) by which all of Hohfeld's fundamental
legal conceptions (legal relations) may be depicted; and a
syntax or scheme for their arrangement (corresponding to the
arrangement of Arabic numerals and lines for long division).
Actual use of these symbols in the analysis of the opinions
in hundreds of cases has of course led to the recognition of the
necessity for some further elaboration.
First of all, a chart should show what it is that causes an
aggregate of legal relations to change. Holland said:
[I]f the right is put in motion, phenomena of a new kind in-
tervene. They are shifting, dynamical, and may be expressed
by the general term "Facts" under which are included, not
only the "Acts" of persons, but also the "Events" which
occur independently of volition. . . . [I]t is through the
agency of "Acts" or of "Events" that rights are created,
transferred, transmuted, and extinguished.24
A jural pasigraphy requires, therefore, a symbol to repre-
sent an act and one to represent an event.
The Restatement's definition of a power, "an ability . . .
to produce a change in a . . . legal relation by doing or not
doing a given act, '2 5 indicates that an act is the exercise of a
24T. HOLLAND, supra note 10, at 78.
25 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 3 (1936).
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power. In his linear graph of concatenation, Kocourek called
this the "evolution of the preceding relation" and depicted
it as "A ( + ) B / A + B."'26 This could be simplified to
A BN/, meaning that the power is exercised, i.e., the act is
done.
The other facts which Holland said would affect legal
relations were called "'events which occur independently of
volition.' ",27 Since such an event, e.g., the expiration of a period
of limitation, occurs independently of any legal relation, it is
properly represented by an entirely independent symbol. For
this purpose a vertical line has proved to be effective. It is
drawn at the proper chronological place in the diagram.
With these symbols it is possible to present an unsophisti-
cated example of the use of a jural pasigraphy. The narrative
of the transaction is divided into the specific facts (acts and
events) of which it is composed, and these are stated in chrono-
logical sequence across the top of the page and are spaced
in such a way as to permit the symbols of the legal relations
to be coordinated with the facts of the transaction. A hori-
zontal line continued toward the right from the symbol of a
legal relation means that the relation continues to exist.
Of course the legal consequences of any act or event de-
pend upon the law of the time and of the place. The diagram
which will be used as an illustration is drawn in accordance
At the
beginning A offers B The statute
of the a promise for B A B of limita-
transaction a promise accepts performs does not tions runs
A--->B V A---> B
offer a revoke
promise for












26 A. KoCOUPREK, supra note 12, at 72.
27 T. HOLLAND, supra note 10, at 78.
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with what is thought to be orthodox contemporary common
law, and a typical statute of limitations. When applied to the
same facts, the law of an earlier day, before the recognition
of trespass on the case in assumpsit, would have produced a
different aggregate of legal relations, as would the contem-
porary law of some other legal system, but in all of these
situations the pasigraphy itself would remain the same. So it
is that analyses by opposing lawyers, even though upon agreed
facts, and even though using the same jural pasigraphy, will
result in different charts because of the use of different law.
It should be repeated that this illustration is an unsophis-
ticated example of the use of a jural pasigraphy, and addi-
tional refinements are required in order to improve its ac-
curacy. Those refinements will now be discussed.
So far, only two kinds of legal relations have been con-
sidered, duties and powers. In the actual analysis of cases it
has been discovered to be necessary to recognize three kinds
of duties (actual, potential, and inchoate) and three kinds of
powers (actual, potential, and inchoate).
An actual duty is one which is presently breachable and
presently enforceable, A <- B.
not trespass
A potential duty is one which is presently breachable, but
not presently enforceable, (A -- B). The failure of B to exer-
exercise care
cise care breaches his duty, but there will be no enforcement
unless and until B's negligence produces substantial harm
to A.
An inchoate duty is one which is not presently breachable
and of course not presently enforceable, [A < B]. There is of
pay on next June 1st
course an actual duty not to repudiate this duty.
The symbol of an actual duty is simply A <- B; a potential
duty is enclosed in parentheses (A < B); and an inchoate duty
is enclosed in brackets [A < B].
The three kinds of powers are distinguished from each
other in the same way.
An actual power is one which is presently exercisable, and
the exercise would have a present effect upon other legal
relations, A - B.
offer
A potential power is one which is presently exercisable, but
1973
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the exercise would not have a present effect upon any other
legal relation. This definition will have to be modified, but
before doing that an example of potential powers will be
described.
If it be assumed that a will does not become a will until
it has been written, signed, published, and witnessed by two
witnesses, then the exercise of the power to write a will does
not itself affect any other legal relation. Nor does the exercise
of the power to sign, nor does the exercise of the power to
publish, nor does the exercise of the power of the first person
to witness. The exercise of the power of the second person to
witness does presently affect other legal relations (for example,
there comes into existence an actual power to revoke) and it
is therefore an actual power. But before one person has wit-
nessed it is not known which of the two will have this actual
power. When the first person witnesses, what had been a
potential power of the second person then becomes an actual
power. It might therefore be said that the power of the first
witness was an actual power because its exercise affected the
power of the second witness. This could lead to a domino
effect which would convert the whole series of powers to
write, to sign, to publish, to witness, into actual powers. In
order to preserve the utility of the concept of a potential power
it has therefore been defined as one which can be presently
exercised, but the exercise will have no present effect other
than to change an existing potential power into an actual power.
The example of the execution of a will would therefore







(W - B) V
witness
( X B-- S) W -- B V/
witness
An inchoate power is one which cannot be presently exer-
cised, and of course no legal relation can be presently affected
by its exercise:
VOL. 50
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[A - B].
enter upon breach of condition
In order to demonstrate the use of this method of dia-
gramming a chart of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,28 a civil
rights case, will be presented. But before doing so, some ad-
ditional symbols which have been found to be useful should
be tabulated.
I to emphasize that a relation is terminated.
X a duty is breached.
0 it is known that some unidentified person is involved in
the legal relation.
A A is now identified as the person.
B IS HARMED
(A -- B)V Double lines show that A's act is
not exercise care deemed to be the legal cause of B's
harm, which is stated in the narrative
of facts, as an event.
Physical cause deemed not to be legal
cause, as a defendant might show in
his chart, would be shown by a single
line rather than by a double line.
IV. AN EXAMPLE- Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
In Mayer, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights
Act of 186629 was a valid exercise of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment, that it prohibited private
racial discrimination in the sale of land, and that therefore
it was error for the district court to have dismissed a com-
plaint in which the plaintiff sought an injunction against a
defendant who was alleged to have refused to sell him a home
solely because he was a Negro.
There are two charts of this case. One presents an analysis
in accordance with the majority opinion, the other an analysis
in accordance with that part of the dissent which argued that
the Act prohibited only state action. The narratives in both
charts are, of course, the same, and are based upon the facts
alleged in the complaint.
A. Comment on Chart 1 - The Majority
There were 36 states in 1865, when Congress proposed the
adoption of the thirteenth amendment. Each of the states there-
28 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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upon acquired a potential power to ratify the amendment.
These are very good examples of potential powers. It will be
recalled that a potential power is one which can be presently
exercised, but its exercise will have no effect upon any other
legal relation, except, in some cases, to change some other
potential power or powers into an actual power or powers.
Because adoption requires ratification by three-quarters of the
states,30 27 of the 36 powers must be exercised, but the first
25 will have no immediate effect. The exercise of its potential
power by the 26th state will cause the potential powers of the
remaining 10 states to become actual powers because the exer-
cise of any one of them will, effectuate the adoption of the
amendment.
The chart begins at a time when 24 states had ratified.
Among those which had not were Alabama, North Carolina,
Georgia, and Oregon. The first column shows that each of
these states had a potential power to ratify. (The other eight
states which had not ratified are omitted because they are
accurately represented by Oregon.)
On December 2, 1865, Alabama, the 25th state, exercised
its potential power to ratify. It is shown that this ended Ala-
bama's power, and that it had no effect upon any other legal
relation.
On December 4, 1865, North Carolina, the 26th state, exercised
its potential power to ratify, thereby changing the potential
powers of Georgia and Oregon-and the eight other states
which are not shown on the chart-to actual powers. This
change in the nature of the powers is shown by eliminating the
parentheses from the symbols, which are repeated on the hori-
zontal lines indicating the continuance of Georgia's power to
ratify and Oregon's power to ratify.
On December 6, 1865, Georgia, the 27th state, ratified,
terminating the powers of all the remaining states because
subsequent ratification by them of an amendment which has
already become a part of the Constitution cannot have any
effect upon the legal continuum. This is shown by the short
vertical line which terminates Oregon's power. Georgia's rati-
fication created in Congress an actual power to enact that all
citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every
state as is enjoyed by white citizens to buy land."1
30 U.S. CONST. art. V.
3142 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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On December 11, 1865, Oregon ratified. This had no effect
upon the legal continuum. Nothing on the chart is changed.
The existing relations simply continue. The same would of
course be true of subsequent ratification by other states.
Congress then enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.32 The
exercise of this power affected the legal continuum by creating
new duties: actual duties owed by the states not to deprive a
citizen of the right to buy land,
not deprive citizen of
right to buy land
and inchoate duties owed by persons in general not to refuse
to sell land to one solely because he is Negro. At the time of
the creation of these duties in 1866 it was not known who would
be the person who would owe the duty 100 years later, nor
to whom it would be owed. Therefore the symbol includes
a circle at each end of the arrow,
[ O<--0].
not to refuse to sell land to
one solely because he is a Negro
These duties are inchoate (and therefore are within brackets)
because they could not be breached until there had been an
offer by a Negro to buy.
Sometime before 1965, Mayer Co. acquired the land in
question. This affected the continuum by creating, inter alia,
an actual duty owed to Mayer Co. by persons in general (the
circle) not to interfere with the possession of the land. This
is but one of the many relations which are usually included
in the aggregate of relations which constitute ownership. An-
other is the actual power of persons in general to offer to buy
the land. At the time of the creation of these powers Jones
was not identified as one of the persons who has such a power,
but when, as stated in the narrative, he made the offer, he was
then identified and a letter J is placed inside the circle.
The symbol
[0 -> 0]
refuse to sell land to one
solely because he is a Negro
appears at the bottom of the first column of the chart, at the
beginning of the transaction, and has continued to exist. It has
32 Id.
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not heretofore been mentioned in the comment because it was
of no importance, but now it is. It is obvious that the persons
had to be represented by circles, and that the power was in-
choate until an offer was made by a Negro. When Jones made
the offer, the power became actual (the brackets are removed
and Jones and Mayer Co. are identified as the persons who
are involved).
Jones' offer also affected the legal continuum by creating
the typical trio of actual powers: to accept; to reject; to revoke.
When Mayer Co. refused to sell to Jones solely because
he was a Negro, this was a breach of the duty under the Civil
Rights Act of 186633 as shown by the X mark. It was also an
exercise of his power to accept Jones' offer! This is shown by
the / mark following the symbol M -. > J, and is the neces-
accepts offer
sary inference from the decision that Jones would be entitled
not merely to damages, but to an injunction. The powers to
reject and to revoke are thereupon ended, and there is created
an actual duty owed by Mayer Co. to Jones to convey the land.
B. Comment on Chart 2- The Dissent
This chart of the dissenting opinion is of course very much
like Chart 1 in general appearance. The narrative is the same.
The first change comes with the enactment by Congress of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. This chart shows that the only effect
upon the continuum was the creation of actual duties owed
by the states not to deprive a citizen of the United States of
the right to buy land.
Since the Act of Congress did not create any duties owed
by persons in general, this chart shows that Jones' offer merely
created actual powers to accept, to reject, or to revoke, and
that Mayer Co.'s refusal was simply a rejection and not the
violation of any duty.
CONCLUSION
These charts have presented almost all of the symbols of
the jural pasigraphy: actual powers, potential powers, in-
choate powers, actual duties, inchoate duties, acts, breaches,
continuation of relations, modification of relations, termination
of relations, relations in which the persons were identified by
the circumstances creating the relations, and relations in which
the persons were not immediately identified. The only important
a, Id.
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symbols which were not used were those of potential duties,
events, and causation.
The process of constructing the charts has demonstrated
that new insights - e.g., that Mayer's apparent refusal of Jones'
offer was really an acceptance - result from the use of pasig-
raphy to analyze cases.

